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Introduction 
 
Inequality of "outcomes" and inequality of "opportunities" have long been associated with very 
different views on social justice, in the literature on economic inequality. The first of these 
concepts refers to the distribution of the joint product of the efforts of a person and the particular 
circumstances under which this effort is made. It is mostly concerned with income inequality. 
The second concept refers to the heterogeneity in those circumstances that lie beyond the control 
of the individual, but that nevertheless significantly affect the results of his efforts, and possibly 
the levels of those efforts themselves. This distinction, the formulation of which is borrowed 
from Roemer (1998), building on earlier work by John Rawls, Amartya Sen and others, is well 
illustrated by the standard opposition between inequality and mobility. The US is often presented 
as more unequal than European societies but at the same time more mobile from a generation to 
the next, a feature which is sometimes taken as the sign of a more equal distribution of chances or 
opportunities in the US. 
1    
 
Despite the obvious importance of the concept of inequality of opportunities, limited empirical 
work has been done in this area, in comparison with the huge literature on the inequality of 
outcomes.
2 The main reasons for this scarcity are probably: (i) the conceptual difficulty of 
separating out ‘circumstances’ and ‘efforts’; and (ii) the limited availability of variables that 
could satisfactorily describe ‘circumstances’. Both of these problems are still more acute in 
developing countries. Yet, knowing what part of observed outcome inequality may be attributed 
to circumstances, and in particular to family background, is as important there as in richer 
nations. Such knowledge should help define the actual scope for redistribution policies and, in 
particular, it should inform the choice between redistributing current income or expanding the 
opportunity sets of the poor, for instance through making the accumulation of human capital 
among children less dependent on their parents.  
 
                                                 
1 For comparisons of mobility between the US and European countries, see Burkhauser et al. (1998), or Checchi et 
al. (1999). 
2 By contrast, social mobility has always been a leading theme of the sociological literature. However, it is not clear 
whether that literature translates easily into standard economic inequality concepts.  3
These issues are particularly relevant in the case of Brazil, because of its high level of (outcome) 
inequality. To what extent is this high inequality due to very unequal opportunities that 
individuals inherit from their parents and to what extent is it the result of some heterogeneity in 
their efforts, or in the returns to these efforts?  Focusing on human capital and education, a 
natural way of answering this question consists of studying the 'demand for schooling' or, in other 
words, how much parents invest in their children, conditionally on their own characteristics. That 
part of schooling inequality which is explained by the characteristics of parents is then taken to 
quantify the inequality of opportunities, whereas the remainder is attributed to heterogeneous 
individual efforts. This approach has been followed by Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) for 
Latin American countries. Barros and Lam (1993), and Lam (1999) applied similar methods to 
Brazil. Given the nature of their data sets, however, these studies focused on expected future 
mobility or, in other words, the relation between the potential earnings of children when they 
become adults, and the earnings of their parents. The approach was not suitable for disentangling 
the  actual share of the inequality of opportunities in today’s levels of overall (outcome) 
inequality. 
 
We follow a different strategy, based on direct information given by survey respondents about the 
education and occupational position of their parents, as available in the 1996 Brazilian household 
survey (PNAD). It turns out that this information permits measuring not only the extent of 
intergenerational educational mobility but also the way in which parents’ characteristics, and 
some other circumstance variables, affect the earnings or income of their children, independently 
of the education of the children. By controlling for the year of birth, it is also possible to see how 
this influence of parents and social background has changed across cohorts and whether 
opportunities account for an increasing or decreasing proportion of total inequality. Although we 
focus on parental education as a central determinant of opportunity, there are other dimensions in 
the space of opportunities, which can be captured by some of the variables in our data set. These 
include parental occupation, race, and the region of origin.  
 
The analysis reveals a sizeable inequality of opportunities in Brazil. First, parental education 
proves to be a powerful independent determinant of individual earnings or income, even when 
controlling for the individual’s own schooling. In addition, parental education is a strong  4
predictor of own schooling. It turns out that, for older cohorts, the distribution of schooling is 
almost fully reproduced – up to some increase in average schooling – across generations. At the 
same time, the analysis also shows that the inequality that would remain among people after 
controlling for the inequality of all observed circumstances - parents' education, occupation, race 
and region of origin - is still very high: higher than the total inequality of outcomes observed in 
many countries in the world. This may be because: (i) important circumstances that shape the 
economic opportunities people face are simply unobserved or unobservable; and/or (ii) the 
functioning of the Brazilian economy is generates high inequality in individual efforts and/or in 
the returns to those efforts.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the theoretical background for the 
estimation work undertaken in the paper, in terms of the general relationship between inequality 
of outcomes and inequality of opportunities. Section 2 discusses estimates of the effect of 
circumstance variables on both individual schooling and earning outcomes. Section 3 then 
presents a range of measures of the influence of the inequality of observed opportunities on the 
inequality of individual earnings. Section 4 generalizes this analysis to the case of household per 
capita incomes. This allows us to account for the role that circumstances may play in welfare 
inequality through labor-force participation behavior, assortative mating and fertility. The 
concluding section places the preceding results in an international perspective and draws some 
simple implications of these results for our understanding of anti-inequality policy in Brazil.  
 
 
1. Conceptual background. 
 
Among the determinants of the earnings of an active individual at any point in time, one can find 
some personal characteristics which are independent of the individual’s will. Following Roemer 
(1998), we call such characteristics “circumstances”, and contrast them to characteristics that, on 
the contrary, reflect “efforts” made by the individual to increase his/her productivity and 
earnings. Let C denote the set of “circumstance” variables and E denote the set of “effort” 
variables. C typically includes fixed socio-demographic attributes like race, sex, region of origin, 
and the individual’s family background. E corresponds essentially to the human capital 
accumulated by the individual once he is free to make decisions for himself. This may include the  5
last part of formal schooling, but also on-the-job training, past decisions to change job or region 
of residence, or current effort at work.  
 
One could then represent the most general form of this relationship between earnings, efforts and 
circumstances as wi = f(Ci, Ei). A first, possibly naïve, attempt to estimate such a relationship 
empirically would be to linearize the model as follows:  
 
Ln(wi) =  Ci.α  + Ei.β  + ui             ( 1 )  
 
where wi denotes current hourly earnings, α  and β  are two vectors of coefficients and ui is a 
residual term that accounts for unobserved circumstance – including sheer luck -  and effort 
variables, measurement error, and transitory departures from the permanent level of earnings. All 
of these factors are assumed to be independent of the variables included in C and E. They are also 
assumed to have zero mean and to be identically and independently distributed across 
individuals.  
 
If inequality were to be measured by the variance of the logarithm of earnings, and if one could 
reasonably assume that circumstances and efforts are mutually independent, then the following 
simple decomposition of total inequality would hold:  
 
v(Ln w) =    α ’.V(C).α  + β ’V(E)β  + v(u)         ( 2 )  
 
where v( ) stands for variances and V( ) for variance-covariance matrices.  In other words, total 
inequality could be explained simply as a weighted sum of the inequality of observed 
opportunities (first term on the RHS), the inequality of observed efforts (second term) and the 
inequality due to unobserved earning determinants.  
 
But the formulation in (1) suffers from a number of obvious shortcomings. First, to assume 
complete additive separability between circumstances and efforts – and independence between all 
the unobservable and observable earning determinants - seems hopelessly inadequate. It seems 
natural, for instance, to allow for the possibility that efforts may themselves be partly determined  6
by circumstances, so that wi = f(Ci, Ei(Ci)). Formal schooling, for example, may be determined at 
least in part by family background. This effect of parental background on the educational 
outcomes of the next generation may occur because more educated parents provide more “home 
inputs” into an “education production function”, such as books, vocabulary and quality time 
spent on homework, but it may also reflect individual learning about the returns to effort, which 
may themselves depend on the circumstances – and indeed on the previous mobility history – of 
the family.
3  Assuming, more modestly, that only unobserved effort determinants are orthogonal 
to observed circumstances, we can write a system of equations for efforts as:  
 
Ei  = Ci.b + vi           ( 3 )  
 
where b is a matrix of coefficients and vi stands for a vector of unobserved effort determinants – 
one component for each component of the vector Ei.  As usual the vi's are supposed to be i.i.d. 
across individuals and with zero mean. Substituting (3) into (1) yields:  
 
Ln(wi) =  Ci.(α  + β .b) + vi β  +  ui           ( 4 )       
 
This reduced-form expression shows that, if the world were reasonably represented by a model 
consisting of equation (1) and the system (3), circumstances have a double effect on wages. They 
affect it directly, for given efforts, through the set of coefficients α . They also affect it indirectly 
through their influence on efforts, the size of this second effect being given by the scalar product 
β .b.
 4 This restatement of the original model modifies the variance decomposition in equation (2) 
and, more generally, any decomposition of the distribution of individual wages into components 
associated with observed circumstances and efforts.  
 
                                                 
3 Hanushek (1986) reviews the literature on the first, ‘production function’ view of the impact of family 
characteristics on individual schooling outcomes. Piketty (1995) models the second type of channel, where 
individual beliefs about opportunities and mobility are formed on the basis of the experience of their own lineages, 
and in turn rationally determine their own effort levels. Our empirical model allows for these indirect effects of 
circumstances (and past history) on  welfare through efforts. It does not distinguish between the alternative channels, 
but it is consistent with both.   
4 For a clear presentation of this distinction between direct and indirect effects of circumstances on current earnings 
see Bowles and Gintis (2002).   7
If one were interested only on the total effect of circumstances on outcomes (measured by 
earnings), then an estimation of the reduced-form equation (4) would suffice. It would be 
impossible to identify the structural parameters α, β and b from the estimated coefficients, but it 
would be possible to treat those coefficients as capturing the combined effects of observed 
circumstances on outcomes. Indeed, the estimates of the complete effects of equalizing observed 
opportunities reported in section 3, and drawn in Figures 1-4, correspond to those which would 
be obtained from a direct OLS estimation of equation (4). But the distinction between direct and 
indirect effects of circumstances on welfare may matter, not only because they are of intrinsic 
interest, but also because they have sharply different implications for policy.  
 
The intrinsic interest of identification of the structural model arises largely from the (closely 
related) literature on intergenerational mobility, which has long struggled to understand the 
nature of the mechanisms through which parental education affects the earnings of children. 
Particular interest has been attached to the relative magnitudes of the impact of the parents’ 
education on the child’s education, vis-à-vis the impact of the parents’ education on the child’s 
labor earnings conditional on own schooling. Given the relative importance of parental schooling 
within our set of circumstance variables, as will be shown below, our identification of the 
structural parameters in (1)-(3) has a bearing on that debate.  
 
In addition, policymakers interested in reducing inequality of opportunities would benefit from 
knowing whether the effect of parental education on child’s earnings operates predominantly 
through the direct effect (in which case, factors such as social network effects in access to 
employment and the importance of family wealth in establishing one’s own business would be 
paramount) or largely through the effect on education (in which case the central policy challenge 
will lie in broadening access to continued schooling opportunities to children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, through programs like cash transfers conditional on school attendance, or special 
after-class help for lagging students). Although a consideration of these specific policies lies 
outside the scope of this paper, the policy relevance of distinguishing direct and indirect effects  8
of circumstances on outcomes lies behind our attempt to identify the structural model, rather than 
being satisfied with running an OLS regression of model (4).
5 
 
Such a decomposition of the impact of circumstances into direct and indirect effects would only 
make sense, however, if one could find unbiased estimates of the various sets of coefficients: α , β  
and b.  Running OLS on equations (1) and (3) is unlikely to yield such estimates. In particular, 
the required assumption that u in equation (1) is orthogonal to C and E may be open to doubt. 
The problem is probably less serious for the circumstance variables. One may not be so much 
interested in the ‘true’ effect of the variables included in C but in their overall impact once their 
correlation with unobservable circumstances are taken into account. This overall impact will be 
truthfully described by the OLS estimate of α . In other words, if parental wealth or income is not 
observed, the estimate of α  will account for the effect on children’s earnings of both the variables 
in C and the effect of that part of parental wealth or income which is correlated with elements of 
C.  
 
The real problem arises when unobservables (u) in the earnings equation cannot be assumed to be 
independent of the effort variables (E). Again, imagine that parental wealth has a direct impact on 
either the schooling or the current earnings of their children (or both), independently of the 
child’s own education. This correlation between u and E, or u and v, introduces bias in the 
estimation of the (α ,β ) coefficients and therefore in the decomposition of the total inequality into 
circumstance and effort components.  
 
One way out of this difficulty would be to observe instrumental variables, Z that would influence 
efforts but not earnings. Equation (3) would then be replaced by:  
 
Ei  = Ci.b + Zi.d + vi              ( 5 )  
 
                                                 
5 Even the structural model (1)-(3) is still somewhat restrictive. Like any parametric model, it relies on certain 
maintained functional form assumptions. Additionally, we chose to be parsimonious in our specification, and have 
omitted various possible interaction terms between circumstance and effort variables, which might have allowed us 
to estimate different rates of returns to efforts for individuals in different circumstances.   9
with the vector Zi being orthogonal to ui. Then instrumenting the effort variables in (1) through 
(5) would yield an unbiased estimator of (α ,β ) and then an unbiased decomposition of total 
inequality into inequality of observed opportunities, or circumstances, and inequality of efforts. 
Models of this type have been extensively used in the literature on returns to education. In the 
standard Mincerian equation, for instance, instrumenting education by family background is 
standard practice to correct for the endogeneity of education. But if family background is an 
independent determinant of earnings in its own right, and indeed one is interested in separating 
out the impacts of the instrument and of the variable it is instrumenting for, as is presently the 
case, then some other instrument is required. Ability tests taken while attending school have 
sometimes been used. But that information is seldom available, particularly in developing 
countries.
6  
 
In the absence of an adequate set of instrumental variables Z, the only solution is to explore the 
likely effect of the potential bias in the estimation of β  due to the correlation between u and v, 
and then to decide on that basis what is the most reasonable range of estimates. This is the 
approach we adopt in this paper, relying on the parametric bounds analysis which is described in 
detail in the appendix.  
 
Once this method yields an interval for the unbiased estimates of the parameters α , β  and b, it 
simply remains to define our measure of  inequality of opportunities, and its contribution to the 
distribution of current earnings. An appealing way of measuring that contribution consists of 
evaluating (through the system of equations (1) and (3)) the counterfactual distribution of 
earnings which would attain if all the inequality due to the circumstance variables had been 
eliminated. This can be done in two steps. First, one can derive from OLS estimates of equation 
(1) above what would be the distribution of earnings if circumstances had been equalized for all 
individuals. The remaining inequality would thus be due essentially to differences in efforts and 
in the residual term, ui. It is then possible to define hypothetical individual earnings: 
 
  i i i u E C w Ln ˆ ˆ . ˆ . ~ + + = β α            ( 6 )  
                                                 
6 Early contributions include Bowles (1972),  Griliches (1972),  Behrman and Taubman (1976). For a survey of all 
models of returns to schooling based on this kind of instrumentation see Card (2001).  10
 
where C  stands for the mean circumstances in the population being studied and the notation ^ 
refers to OLS estimates of equation (1).  Comparing that hypothetical distribution { i w ~ , i = 1, 2, 
..N } with the actual distribution {wi, i = 1, 2, ..N } allows us to evaluate the distributional effect 
of the inequality of observed opportunities in C.   
 
Of course, the preceding definition would be justified on normative grounds only if observed 
efforts in E and unobserved efforts in u, were solely the reflection of individual preferences and 
were unaffected by C. But, if efforts also depend on circumstances, the preceding evaluation of 
the effect of the inequality of opportunities is only partial. If all circumstances were included in 
C, then it is the residual, v, of equation (3) that would describe the effect of the heterogeneity of 
individual preferences on observed efforts. Thus, equalizing circumstances would lead to a partial 
equalizing of efforts that would in turn contribute to an additional equalizing of individual 
earnings. Formally, this would lead to a distribution of earnings  { i w
~ ~ , i = 1, 2, ..N } defined by : 
 
i i i u v b C w Ln ˆ ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ˆ .(
~ ~ + + + = β β α         ( 7 )  
 
where  i v b ˆ and ˆ are OLS estimates of equation (3).  
The comparison of the actual distribution {wi, i = 1, 2, ..N} and the distribution { i w
~ ~ , i = 1, 2, ..N } 
fits the definition that Roemer (1998) gives of the inequality of opportunities, even though in a 
very simple way.
7 It shows the complete effect of observed circumstances on the distribution of 
earnings. By contrast, the comparison of the actual distribution with the distribution { i w ~ , i = 1, 2, 
..N } is only partial. Comparing the two approaches allows us to distinguish the part of the 
inequality of opportunities that goes through the direct effect of circumstances on outcomes, from  
                                                 
7  Actually, interpreting Roemer's theory of the equality of opportunities literally would lead to measure the 
inequality of opportunities by comparing earnings for each percentile of the distribution of the residual term, vi , and 
then aggregating  across percentiles. In the present case, this would be equivalent to comparing  the distribution 
obtained by equalizing the residual terms ui and vi on the one hand, with perfect equality, on the other. Equalizing 
circumstances as we do here is in some sense complementary of that approach and offers the advantage of using the 
actual distribution of earnings rather than equality as a benchmark.   11
the part that goes through the effect of circumstances on efforts. This is why we report results 
from both the partial and complete estimates below. 
 
Before closing this conceptual section, we note that when circumstance variables include parental 
characteristics, it is natural to think of the preceding analysis as being related to intergenerational 
mobility. A direct measure of income mobility would be provided by the preceding model if 
parents’ income was among the variables C. But other types of mobility may be behind equation 
(3). For instance, if parental education is included in C and individuals’ schooling is in E, then 
part of system (3) actually describes intergenerational educational mobility. The coefficient b that 
relates the education level of children to that of parents is an (inverse) indicator of that mobility. 
For instance, if education is measured in number of years of schooling for both parents and 
children, then the extent to which b is less than unity would describe how fast differences in 
education tend to systematically lessen across generations.
8 It can be seen on equation (4) that the 
degree of intergenerational educational persistence, b , partly determines the share of current 
earnings inequality which is due to differences in circumstances or opportunities. 
 
2. Earnings and educational mobility in Brazil 
 
This method is now applied to Brazilian data.  This section first describes the data and the nature 
of the variables being used. It then discusses the various estimates obtained both for the earnings 
equations and for the efforts equations. The latter can also be seen as describing intergenerational 
educational mobility in Brazil. 
 
Data and variables  
 
Data are from the 1996 wave of the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem a Domicilio (PNAD), the 
Brazilian Household Survey. For that year, information is available on the education and 
                                                 
8 Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2000) define intergenerational educational mobility as the share of the residual in  
the variance of schooling in equation (3) rather than as the value of  1-b. The two concepts are equivalent only when 
the distribution of schooling has the same variance for parents and children.   12
occupation of the parents of all surveyed household heads and spouses.
9 The analysis is restricted 
to urban areas because of the general imprecision of earnings and income measurement in rural 
areas.
10 It is also restricted to individuals 26 to 60 years old, in an effort to concentrate on 
individuals having finished schooling and potentially active in the labor market.  
 
The analysis described in the preceding section is conducted on 5-year cohorts - from individuals 
born between 1936-40 up to those born between 1966-70. This permits not only measuring the 
role of the inequality of opportunities in shaping the inequality of observed earnings at a point in 
time, but also to study how this role may have changed over time. An important question is 
indeed whether the increase in the educational level of successive cohorts was accompanied by 
more or less inequality of opportunities or whether it corresponded to a uniform upward shift in 
schooling achievements, with constant inequality of opportunities.  Comparing various cohorts 
observed at a single point in time allows us to shed some light on this issue.  
 
The analysis first focuses on individual earnings, measured as “real hourly earnings from all 
occupations”. In a second stage, the analysis will be conducted for welfare levels, measured by 
household income per capita. This will allow us to discuss the roles of labor supply behavior and 
fertility as additional channels through which the inequality of opportunities affects the inequality 
of outcomes. 
 
The vector of circumstance variables, C, includes race dummy variables, parental education 
expressed as numbers of years of schooling 
11, the occupational position of the father
12 - a 9-level 
categorical variable-  and dummies for the regions of origin.  The vector of effort variables, E,  is 
                                                 
9  The same information is available in both the 1982 and the 1988 surveys. Earnings in the 1982 survey were 
collected with respect to a different reference period (of three months) and are therefore not comparable with other 
years.  The 1988 survey was used to check the robustness of some of the results reported in this paper.  
10 See Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri (2003) for a discussion of the shortcomings of rural income data from the PNAD. 
11 Parental education is given in discrete levels. They were converted into years of schooling (here in brackets) using 
the following rule.  No school or incomplete 1st grade (0); incomplete elementary  (2); complete elementary, or 
complete 4
th grade (4); incomplete 1
st cycle of secondary or 5
th to 7
th grade  (6); complete 1
st cycle of secondary or 
complete 8
th grade  (8); incomplete 2
nd cycle (9.5); complete 2
nd cycle of secondary  (11); incomplete superior (13); 
complete superior (15); master or doctorate (17). 
12 The 9-level occupational categories are: rural workers (1); domestic servants (2); traditional sector workers (3); 
service sector workers (4); modern industry workers (5); self-employed shopkeepers (6); technicians, artists and desk 
workers (7); employers (8); liberal professionals (9). This classification is borrowed from Brazilian sociological 
studies on occupational mobility (see Pero, 2001; Valle e Silva, 1978)  13
restricted to the individual schooling, measured in years 
13, years of schooling squared, to capture 
possible non-linearities, and a migration dummy, defined as whether the observed municipality of 
residence is different from the one where the individual was born.
14 Descriptive statistics of the 
main variables are shown in Table 1.  
 
Earnings equations 
 
Earnings equations were estimated separately for men and women, and by cohort, using OLS for 
men and the standard two-stage selection bias correction procedure for women 
15. Results are 
shown in Table 2. Note that, unlike in the standard Mincerian specification, age or imputed 
experience do not appear among the regressors because we are treating cohorts as age-
homogeneous by definition. 
 
Circumstance variables have the expected effect on earnings. The coefficients of racial dummy 
variables are negative and significant for both blacks and ‘pardos’.
16 They are generally positive, 
but not always significant for people with an Asian origin. It is interesting that the racial gap 
against blacks and 'pardos' is less pronounced for women. It is not even always significant. 
Regional differences are important, too. With the South-East as a reference, being born in the 
North-East has a strong and significantly negative effect for both men and women. The effect of 
the other regions is generally also negative, but seldom significant. The estimated effect of mean 
parental education on individual earnings is always positive, significant, and relatively stable 
across cohorts. It is also sizable since it amounts to a 3 to 6 per cent increase in earnings, for each 
additional year of schooling of the parents. The difference between the education of the father 
and the mother is meant to detect a possible asymmetry in the role of the two parents. But no 
such asymmetry seems to be systematically present. Concerning the estimated effect of father’s 
                                                 
13 The number of years of schooling directly provided in the PNAD is bounded at 15.  For consistency with the scale 
used for parents' schooling, this variable was changed to 17 for individuals reporting a master or a doctorate degree. 
14 The decision to migrate might have been a decision of the individual him/herself when adult, or of his parents 
when he was still a child. While in principle it should be taken as a circumstance variable in the second case and as 
an effort variable only in the first case, we  can not distinguish the two from the available data. We treat migration as 
an effort because results are more consistent with efforts than circumstances, as we will see below, but this 
interpretation should be treated with considerable caution. 
15 The Heckman correction was initially applied to men as well, but available instruments proved unsatisfactory. 
16 Race is self-reported in the PNAD: the respondent, rather than the interviewer, chooses his or her race. ‘Pardo’ is 
meant to refer to people of mixed-race, generally involving some Afro-Brazilian component.  14
occupation on earnings, it is generally positive - the reference category being rural workers -
though seldom significant across cohorts, once we control for education, except for self-
employed shopkeepers and employers. 
17  
 
Turning now to the vector of “effort” variables, own education has the usual positive and 
significant effect on earnings for men. This effect is decreasing as one considers younger male 
cohorts. This is consistent with the negative coefficient generally found for the squared imputed 
experience term –i.e. age minus number of years of schooling minus first schooling age - in the 
standard Mincerian specification. This implies that returns to schooling increase with age, which 
is exactly what is found here.
18   The coefficient of schooling is sometimes insignificant, 
particularly for women. The reason is that the overall education effect is captured by the squared 
years of schooling term, which is positive and significant both for men and women. This means 
that the marginal return to education increases with the number of years of schooling.  
 
The order of magnitude obtained for the return to schooling in the preceding equations is 
somewhat lower than previous estimates for Brazil. For instance, Ferreira and Paes de Barros 
(1999) found that the marginal return to a year of schooling lies in the range 12 to 15 percent for 
both men and women in 1999. In Table 2, marginal returns at 5 years of schooling range from 7 
to 11 percent for men and from 11 to 13 percent at 10 years of schooling. This may be due in part 
to the specification being used here, which is not strictly comparable to the Mincerian model. The 
difference is also consistent, however, with the probable over-estimation of the returns to 
schooling in an earnings equation that does not include family background variables.
19  
 
                                                 
17 In fact, we observed that all father’s occupational categories are highly significant determinants of individuals’ 
years of schooling in our effort equations described further on. Only self-employed and employers seem to be 
significant determinants of earnings, independently from education.  
18 The conventional Mincerian specification is such that: Lnw = a.S + b.Exp – c.Exp² where Exp = Age – S – 6. 
Expanding the Exp term leads to: Lnw = (a-b-12c).S + 2cAge.S - c.S
2 + terms in Age or Age squared. If this equation 
is estimated within groups with constant age, one should indeed observe that the coefficient of S is higher in older 
cohorts. Note that the present specification also includes an independent S
2 term.   
19 The preceding intuition is fully confirmed by the data used in this study. In unreported regressions, though 
available from the authors upon request, we have re-estimated the preceding wage equation with years of schooling 
instrumented by parents' schooling achievements and the other exogenous variables of the model, and with parents' 
education excluded from the regressors. The coefficients of the number of years of schooling turn out to be 
substantially higher than in the previous case because they now partly account for the direct influence of parental 
education on individual earnings. Their order of magnitude is also comparable to what has been found in other 
earnings equations estimated for Brazil (see, for example, Ferreira and Paes de Barros, 1999).   15
Migration has a significant and positive effect on earnings, both for men and women. This sign 
would be consistent with a human capital interpretation of migration.  Because the coefficient is 
rather large, amounting to a 10-18 per cent increase in earnings, it is tempting to consider this as 
an effort variable. But, it may also reflect the decision of parents to move to an area with better 
income opportunities when the surveyed individual was still a child, in which case this variable 
should be taken as indicative of circumstances. If this were true, however, the size of the 
estimated coefficients would suggest very much persistence in the earnings differential that might 
have motivated the migration of the parents.
20   
 
Effort equations and intergenerational educational mobility 
 
Let us now turn to estimates of equation (3), and consider the impact of circumstances on efforts 
(i.e. schooling and migration). Because no significant model for migration was found, this 
variable is dropped from the analysis. Regression results for schooling are shown in Tables 3a 
and 3b separately for men and women.  They call for several remarks. 
 
The first set of remarks has to do with intergenerational educational mobility as measured, 
inversely, by the coefficient of parental education. The higher that coefficient, the stronger is 
parental education in determining the schooling of their children, and therefore the less mobility 
there is. Because education is measured for both parents and children in years of schooling, a unit 
value for that coefficient is a convenient reference. It would correspond to the perpetuation of 
differences in years of schooling across generations – this being consistent with an increase in 
mean schooling. Conversely, a coefficient less than unity means that educational differences tend 
to diminish across generations. From that point of view, a striking feature in tables 3a and 3b is 
that the coefficient of the mean schooling of parents is significantly below unity and has been 
decreasing continuously and significantly over time.  Overall the gain is substantial. For people 
born in the early 1940s, a one-year difference in the schooling of their parents resulted in a 
difference of approximately 0.75 years in their own schooling. For those born in the late 1960s, 
the same initial difference in parental education resulted in approximately half a year of 
schooling.  
                                                 
20  Note that we are considering migration across municipalities and not regions for which persistence of earning gap  16
 
Attributing this decline entirely to the general rise in mean education over time would be 
incorrect, because of the role of the intercept in this effort equation. If a majority of children are 
now going to school for 5 years whereas the majority was going to school only for 3 years 20 
years ago, it may seem natural that the influence of parental education declined with time. This is 
not necessarily true, however. This 2-year addition to mean schooling achievement might very 
well hold for the whole population, whatever their family background. If this were the whole 
story, then only the intercept in the regressions reported in tables 3a and 3b would be increasing 
across successive cohorts, and the coefficients of all variables would remain constant.  This is 
clearly true of race, for instance, for which no clear trend seems to be present. Black people have 
the same quantitative disadvantage in education in the 1960s - 1 to 2 years of schooling - as they 
had in the 1940s or the 1950s. Likewise, the disadvantage of being born in the North-East for 
men has remained approximately constant. In effect, only the coefficient reflecting the 
disadvantage of being born from parents with a low level of schooling seems to have been falling 
regularly over time.  In other words, the conditional distribution of educational opportunities 
seems to have remained approximately constant over time, except with respect to educational 
family background.  
 
An interesting feature of intergenerational educational mobility is that intra-household decision 
mechanisms seem to matter more for the education of women than for men. The transmission of 
education from parents to girls is higher, the greater the mother’s schooling relative to the 
father’s. This effect is significant and persistent across cohorts. For boys, however, although the 
mother’s education still seems to weigh more than the father’s, the difference is only significant 
for a single cohort. In both cases, it is difficult to find a trend in the evolution across cohorts. 
 
A full understanding of the inequality of educational opportunities in Brazil would require a more 
detailed analysis. In particular, very much of the preceding discussion is based on measuring 
education in terms of the number of years of schooling. One might prefer a more general 
approach based on ‘human capital’ rather than years of schooling, where human capital might be 
measured by the cost of education, including forgone earnings, or possibly by the earnings that a 
                                                                                                                                                              
would be natural.   17
given schooling level actually commands. Also, the quality of schooling is totally ignored in the 
preceding description of intergenerational educational mobility. However, it cannot be ruled out 
that taking into account the quality of education, so as to get closer again to a concept of human 
capital, would modify the preceding conclusion of an increasing educational mobility in Brazil.
21 
Unfortunately, there is no data source in Brazil which combines information on plausible 
measures of educational quality with information on the schooling of parents, for individuals 
currently active in the labor market.  
 
3. Evaluating the inequality of opportunities and its influence on the inequality of earnings 
 
The methodology presented in section 1 is now applied on the basis of the preceding earnings and 
effort equations. Making all variables in the analysis explicit, the two basic equations (1) and (3) 
now write:  
  
i M i S i S i F i D i P i G i R i i u M S S FO DPE MPE GR R w Ln + + + + + + + + + = β β β α α α α α α . . . . . . . ) ( 2
2
0         (8) 
i F i D i P i G i R i i v b FO b DPE b MPE b GR b R b S + + + + + + = . . . . 0                 (9) 
 
where S is the number of years of schooling of the surveyed individual, S
2 the square of than 
number, and M his/her migrant status. R, GR, MPE, DPE and FO stand respectively for the race 
dummies, the regional dummies, mean parental schooling, the mother/father difference in 
schooling, and father occupation. α R , α G , bR, and bG are vectors of coefficients whereas other 
parameters (α P , α D , α F , β S , β S2 , β M , bP , bD , bF) are scalars.  Estimates of all these coefficients 
are partly shown in Tables 2 and 3 and they have been discussed extensively in the preceding 
section. In principle, there should be an equation like (9) for all effort variables appearing in 
equation (8), that is, for S,  S² and M. However, the equation for S² necessarily leads to 
conclusions similar as (9) whereas it was not possible to identify any significant effect of the 
circumstance variables on the migration status, M.   
 
                                                 
21 See Albernaz, Ferreira and Franco (2002) for a discussion of the variance of educational quality in Brazil, as 
measured by standardized test scores, and of its determinants.   18
Identifying the role played by the inequality of opportunities in the distribution of current 
earnings consists of equalizing the circumstance variables either in equation (8) – for the “partial” 
effect - or in both equation (8) and (9) – for the “complete” effect. The distribution obtained in 
the first case accounts partially for the inequality of opportunities, because it ignores its role 
through determining the level of efforts, whereas the second distribution accounts also for this 
latter effect.  
 
Simulation results are shown in Figures 1a-b and 2a-b. Although it would have been possible to 
show the whole distribution resulting from equalizing circumstances, only two summary 
inequality measures of these distributions are presented, to save on space. Figures 1a and 2a show 
the Gini coefficient for men and women respectively, whereas figures 1b and 2b show the Theil 
coefficient. In all figures, the top line represents the inequality actually observed for the various 
cohorts. The line below it shows the “partial” effect of equalizing circumstances, whereas the 
bottom line shows the “complete” effect. Finally, the dotted lines around the two bottom lines 
show upper and lower bounds for the preceding estimates, as explained in the appendix.  
 
The complete effect of equalizing circumstances is to reduce the Gini coefficient by 8-10 
percentage points, for all cohorts of both men and women. Ignoring the effect of circumstances 
on individual effort variables, in the 'partial effect' calculation, leads to a drop of approximately 
half of that effect. Again, this is true for practically all cohorts, for both men and women earners. 
The absolute and relative drops are more pronounced with the Theil coefficient than with the 
Gini. In any case, equalizing circumstance variables leads to a drop in the Theil of between 12 
and 25 points for the complete effect – the 35 points drop observed for the 1941-1945 being 
clearly exceptional.  
 
Naturally, the parametric bounds analysis used to address the endogeneity bias in the estimation 
of the two equations generates some imprecision in some of the estimates. Indeed, dotted curves 
in Figures 1a to 2b show that the unknown degree of endogeneity of efforts makes the estimated 
partial or direct effect of equalizing circumstances on the distribution of earnings rather 
imprecise. The distance between the extreme bounds is 2 to 4 percentage points for men in the 
case of the Gini coefficient and 4 to 6 points for women. By contrast, bounds on the complete  19
effects are extremely close to the mean effects. In other words, there is very little ambiguity about 
the important role played by the inequality of opportunities in shaping the unequal distribution of 
earnings in Brazil. The statistical imprecision is only about the way in which this occurs, that is 
about how much of the effect of circumstances on earnings is mediated through the impact of 
circumstances on efforts.
22 
 
Several conclusions may be drawn from these experiments. The first is that, even after correcting 
for the inequality of observed opportunities, inequality in Brazilian earnings remains very high, 
with a Gini coefficient above 0.44 for all cohorts and sometimes even above 0.5. Two 
interpretations are possible. On the one hand, observed circumstance variables accounted for in 
the present analysis (i.e. parents’ education, father’s occupation, region of origin and race) are 
actually a limited subset of all circumstances. Among those potentially observable, parental 
income or wealth are not available in our data set. Yet, they are accounted for in part by observed 
variables with which they are correlated, such as parental education, occupation and region of 
origin.
23 It would thus be surprising if their inclusion drastically modified the preceding results. 
As for circumstance variables that are intrinsically unobservable, they are by their very nature 
analytically and practically irrelevant for understanding the sources of inequality in Brazil. On 
the other hand, it may simply be the case that observed non-opportunity related earnings 
inequality is very high in Brazil, and presumably higher than in other countries. Possible reasons 
for this include structural characteristics of the labor market that would tend to magnify 
differences across people with the same observed background, or possibly a large variance of 
persistent and non-persistent shocks in the earning career of individuals.  
 
A second important conclusion of the analysis is that the proportion, or even the absolute value of 
inequality due to observed opportunities in actual inequality seems rather stable across cohorts, 
regardless of whether the Gini or Theil coefficients are considered. This finding is consistent with 
                                                 
22 The fact that the bounds are close to each other for the complete effect and far apart for the partial effect is not 
really surprising. It may be seen from (7) that the estimation of the complete effect is in some sense equivalent to a 
reduced form model, where (log) earnings is a function of circumstances only. There would be no OLS bias in that 
case. This is in contrast with the partial effect model (6), where the coefficients may be strongly biased because of 
the endogeneity of efforts.  
23 To check how income is correlated with education, occupation and region of origin in the current generation – 
which is the best we can do - we ran a regression of income on these variables for the PNAD respondents with 
children. R-squares are in the range 0.31 - 0.42, depending on the cohort.   20
the idea that circumstances are essentially responsible for differences in the “starting point” of 
individual earnings. Later in the life-cycle, however, other factors are responsible for changes in 
inequality. The fact that both actual inequality and circumstance-corrected inequality increase in 
a parallel way with age is consistent with persistent circumstance-independent labor market 
shocks for active individuals.
24  
 
On the basis of the increased intergenerational educational mobility discussed above, one might 
have expected to see the proportion of the inequality accounted for by opportunities fall, when 
moving from older to younger generations. That this is not the case may have several 
explanations. Two of them are as follows. First, the change in intergenerational educational 
mobility found in the education equations above may be too limited to have a significant effect 
on the inequality of earnings. Second, returns to education tend to be lower for the youngest 
generations, which somewhat compensates the equalizing effect of more intergenerational 
educational mobility.    
 
Finally, it is interesting to evaluate the role of particular circumstance variables in the preceding 
results. The complete effect of equalizing individual circumstance variables is shown for the Gini 
coefficient on figures 3a and 3b – results are qualitatively analogous for the Theil coefficient. It 
can be seen there that, of all circumstance variables, parental education plays the largest role in 
determining inequality. Father's occupation is the second most important variable but, as it is 
correlated with education, its independent contribution is smaller than suggested by figures 3. 
With respect to education, it is worth emphasizing that results are not very different when 
parental schooling is not equalized across the board, but instead a lower bound is imposed, as if 
schooling were compulsory until a certain age. This means that it is the inequality of education at 
the bottom of the distribution that really matters to explain the contribution of the inequality of 
opportunities to actual inequality in earnings. Interestingly enough, race alone seems to account 
for very little, when parental occupation and education are already controlled for. These results 
suggest that the most effective policies for reducing inequality of opportunities in Brazil would 
be those that reduced the effect of parental education on their child’s schooling and earnings. 
This conclusion  is even stronger for women than for men.   
                                                 
24 This law of increasing variance of earnings breaks down in Brazil only for the older cohorts of men and women.  21
 
4. The effects of the inequality of opportunities on the distribution of household income   
 
The analysis so far has referred to the earnings of active individuals. The same type of analysis 
may also be conducted for economic welfare levels, whether the individuals are active or not. 
Why should one rule out women who are out of the labor force from the measurement of the 
inequality of opportunities? That she is outside the labor force and has many children may well 
be a channel through which circumstance variables affect the economic welfare of an individual. 
This section thus focuses on measuring the effect of the inequality of opportunities faced in the 
past by household heads and spouses on the distribution of economic welfare among them. The 
welfare measure used in this section is the monetary household income per capita. Thus each 
adult in the population – or more precisely: all household heads and spouses - is imputed a 
welfare level equal to income per capita in his/her household. With this new definition, the 
opportunities faced by household heads and spouses now affect not only their earnings, as before, 
but also their participation behavior, fertility, non-labor income and, of course, the matching of 
individuals within couples.   
 
In an effort to capture these effects the previous model was re-estimated substituting household 
per capita income for earnings and considering the whole population of adults rather than earners 
only. In effect, three different models were estimated, with the objective of identifying various 
channels through which opportunities affect welfare: individual earnings, labor supply behavior, 
fertility, etc.. . In all cases, the welfare level of individual i is given by:  
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where m(i) is the household of which i is the head or the spouse, yjm(i) is the earnings of member j 
(=h for household head ,s for spouse),  y0m(i) is non-labor income – really, income on top of the 
earnings of h and s -  and nm(i) is the number of persons in the household.  
 
The first model generalizes directly the approach from the previous section. The earnings of each 
active member, h or s, is taken as a function of the circumstances and efforts of that person:  
                                                                                                                                                              
Evidence of this age-dependence of earnings inequality in other countries is analyzed in Deaton and Paxson (1994).    22
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The estimation is run only on individuals with positive earnings. The simulations are carried out 
as before by equalizing circumstances and re-computing earnings for all active persons. Then 
(10) is applied to these simulated earnings, and the resulting income per capita is imputed to all 
individuals, active or not. This model therefore estimates only those effects of the inequality of 
opportunities on the distribution of welfare which are mediated through the channel of individual 
earnings, treating household composition, occupational decisions and non-labor incomes as 
given. 
 
The second model aims at identifying effects on household size and composition. Besides 
individual earnings, family size is now allowed to depend on circumstance and effort variables of 
the two spouses, according to the familiar multinomial logit specification. This model can be 
described as follows :  
 
{}
∑
= = + = + + =
p
Z
Z
i m i i i i i i i
p i m
k i i m
e
e
k n v b C E u E C y Log
λ
λ
β α
) (
) (
) ( Pr ; ; ) (   ( I I )  
where Zi  reasonably includes the circumstances and efforts of the two parents {Chm(i), Csm(i), 
Ehm(i), Esm(i),} and k = {2, 3, .., 7 and more) is family size.  
 
The third model is completely reduced-form. We now simply regress the welfare level of 
individual i on circumstance and effort variables. But this income per capita naturally depends on 
the circumstances and efforts of both spouses since it incorporates the earnings of both.  The 
model thus writes : 
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This estimation is run on two parent/adult households, whereas model (I) continues to apply to 
singles or single parent households.    23
 
Model (III) takes into account various channels through which the inequality of opportunities 
may affect the distribution of personal welfare. It does so in reduced-form, however, and it is thus 
impossible to disentangle them from just this model. Behind equation (III), is not only the way in 
which individual circumstances and efforts affect individual earnings, but also how they affect 
labor supply behavior, the presence of non-labor income, the matching of spouses, or fertility, 
since the household size is also present in the definition of the level of welfare.  
 
Using these three models, the effect of equalizing the circumstances of household heads and 
spouses on the distribution of welfare may be simulated in various ways. Comparing these ways 
permits identifying some of the channels through which circumstances affect the distribution of 
welfare. Consider the three following simulations:  
 
) ( ) ( 0 ) ( ) (
* / ) ( i m i m
I
i sm
I
i hm i n y y y y + + =  
II
i m
I
i sm
I
i hm i i m n y y y y
) ( / ) ( ) ( 0 ) ( ) (
* * + + =  
III
i i y y =
* * *  
 
where the left-hand side variable is income per capita in the household which i belongs to after 
equalizing circumstance variables according to model (I), (II), and (III). Model (I) shows the 
effect of equalizing circumstances through the sole channel of the earnings of active people. 
Comparing  {}
*
i y and  {}
* *
i y should inform on the role played by the household size channel. 
Finally, comparing the distribution {}
*
i y and  {}
* * *
i y - should show by difference the role played 
together by the labor supply channel, fertility, matching and non-labor income. All of these 
simulations are performed with the specification for the 'complete effect' of equalizing 
circumstances – i.e. taking into account the indirect effect of circumstances, which operates 
through their impact on effort choices.  
 
It may be seen in Table 4 that the drop in inequality obtained from equalizing the effect of 
circumstances on earnings is approximately the same when considering the distribution of 
household income per capita as when analyzing individual earnings (in the previous section). In  24
both cases, the Gini coefficient falls by some 8 to 10 percentage points, whereas the fall in the 
Theil coefficient for the distribution of welfare roughly corresponds to the average fall observed 
for male and female earnings inequality – see figures 1b and 2b.  To the extent that potential 
earnings and family background tends to be positively and rather strongly correlated within 
couples, such a result was to be expected.  
 
The role of household composition (including fertility) may be identified by comparing the 
effects of models I and II in table 4. Unsurprisingly, one can check that the complete effect of 
equalizing circumstances is limited for oldest cohorts and increases continuously as age goes 
down. For younger cohorts, the effect that circumstances have on per capita income through the 
household size effect is rather sizable: more than 4 percentage points of the Gini and 8 points of 
the Theil coefficient. Yet, this result must be understood with care. The analysis behind the 
results shown in table 4 is purely mechanical. More or less children reduce or increase income 
per capita in a pure arithmetic sense. The induced effects of fertility on labor-force participation, 
or the fact that a large number of children may depend on the potential earnings of parents are not 
taken into account in this calculation. To do so, a structural model should be used.  
 
Moving now to the more general, reduced-form model where circumstances are allowed to affect 
the distribution of welfare through any number of channels,  contrasting results are obtained. The 
additional drop in inequality in model (III) with respect to model (I) is substantial for the oldest 
cohorts, amounting to 6 percentage points of the Gini for the oldest one and 3 points for the one 
that follows. But then the fall in inequality is only 2 percentage points on average for all younger 
cohorts. A comparable pattern is observed with the Theil coefficient. Together, these results 
suggest that life-cycle related phenomena may be at work.  
 
Fertility is one of these phenomena and it has already been analyzed. Other channels through 
which equalizing circumstances may affect the distribution of welfare are labor supply, choice of 
partner, and non-labor income. Their effect may be gauged from comparing the 3
rd and 4
th block 
in table 4. These residual effects were largest for the oldest cohort. Indeed, they were responsible 
for a drop in the inequality of welfare among the oldest generations, but for an increase among 
the youngest. For the oldest cohorts, one may think that the incidence of retirement income may  25
play an important role. It has been shown in previous work that pensions are so regressive in 
Brazil that they do much to explain the excess in the country’s inequality relative, say, to the 
United States – see Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2002). As these pensions are likely to go to 
individuals with favorable family circumstances, a large effect may indeed be expected through 
this channel for the oldest cohorts in the present sample. For the youngest cohorts the 
unequalizing effect of equalizing circumstances that goes through labor supply and non-labor 
income is more puzzling, even though it is limited in size.  
 
A possible explanation would be the negative dependence of female participation on non-labor 
and male labor income. By equalizing circumstances, this income source is becoming smaller 
among the richest households and bigger among the poorest ones. If participation behavior 
depended only on current income and not independently on circumstances, it would follow that 
female participation would go up among the richest and down among the poorest. Thus 
equalizing circumstances would lead to more inequality on the participation account.  
 
Even if this argument helps explain the results shown in Table 4, the labor supply channel for the 
effect of equalizing circumstances is likely to be far more complicated than implicitly assumed 
here. First, circumstances may have a direct effect on participation, independently of income. 
Second, potential earnings are also likely to be an important determinant of labor supply with the 
opposite effect of equalizing circumstances on inequality. Third, fertility behavior is also likely to 
affect labor supply, as mentioned above. For all these reasons, it would seem necessary to rely on 
a structural model that would include all these dimensions of behavior to fully understand the 
origin of the preceding effects. Doing so might also show that relying on pure monetary income 
to define welfare, as done here without any correction for labor supply, may not be satisfactory.  
 
In summary, the role of the inequality of opportunities in shaping the distribution of household 
welfare is larger than in the case of individual earnings. If observed circumstances could be 
equalized, welfare inequality would go down by much more than earnings inequality. The drop in 
the Gini coefficient is around 12 percentage points for incomes and around 8 points for earnings. 
As the arithmetic effect that goes through individual earnings in the case on welfare inequality is 
comparable in size to what was found for individual earnings, additional effects must be at work  26
in the case of household income per capita. The simple simulations undertaken in this section 
suggest that household size and composition, labor force participation and non-labor income are 
important channels through which opportunities can affect the distribution of household income. 
A precise identification of the contribution of each channel remains for future work. At this stage, 
only the household size channel has been shown to be potentially very important, particularly 
among younger households. 
  
Nevertheless, the conclusion that inequality in Brazil remains very high even after equalizing 
observed circumstances holds in the case of the distribution of welfare, just as it did for 
individual earnings. When all effects are taken into account as in the bottom rows of Table 4, 
equalizing circumstances still leaves a Gini coefficient of approximately 0.5. This is undoubtedly 
high by all international standards.  
  
5.  Summary and conclusion 
 
This paper tried to quantify the role of the inequality of opportunities – associated with people’s 
race, region of origin, the education and the occupation of their parents – in generating inequality 
in current earnings and incomes in Brazil. We estimated the impact of opportunities (or 
circumstances) both directly on earnings and incomes, and indirectly on the level of efforts – 
such as schooling - undertaken by individuals. We took account of the biases arising from the 
lack of adequate instruments for correcting for the endogeneity of some of the income 
determinants, by showing upper and lower bounds for the unbiased estimates, for plausible 
values of the bias.  
 
Altogether, the inequality of observed opportunities is responsible for a very substantial 
proportion of total outcome inequality in Brazil. It accounts for approximately 8-10 percentage 
points of the Gini coefficient for individual earnings. Fifty-five to 75 percent of this share can be 
attributed to parental schooling alone, and 70 to 80 percent when the father's occupation is added. 
The effect of opportunities is even higher for household income per capita, amounting to some 12 
percentage points of the Gini (and even more for some cohorts). The reason for this difference 
with individual earnings is that opportunities affect welfare levels both through earnings and  27
through additional channels. This is true in particular of household size and composition and, 
probably to a lesser extent, of labor-force participation, non-labor income and assortative mating. 
 
Although international comparisons of the intergenerational transmission of inequality are always 
difficult - because of differences in definition, methodology and data type - the preceding figures 
nevertheless look high by international standards. Table 5 shows that the share of the variance of  
(log) wages explained by the (log) wage of the parents lies between 1 and 35 percent in most 
existing studies for developed countries. The circumstance variables used in this study – which 
exclude parental income - already explain between 25 and 30 per cent of the variance of the (log) 
earnings rate, and they would probably explain still more if the parental income or wealth was 
observed. Likewise, the share of the variance of (log) family income is between 2 and 42 per cent 
in existing studies in other countries. It is between 32 and 44 per cent for Brazil. Of course both 
comparisons must be related to intergenerational educational mobility figures. The singularity is 
obvious here too. Parents’ schooling explain at most 20 per cent of children’s schooling in 
existing studies. This proportion is between 35 and 47 per cent in Brazil. In effect, the inequality 
of opportunities in Brazil compares only with the maximum estimate obtained in the literature for 
(log) family consumption in the US.  
 
Our finding that the degree of intergenerational educational persistence in Brazil is high by 
international standards is consistent with the results of two other recent studies which use the 
same PNAD data set we used: Dunn (2003) and Ferreira and Veloso (2003). If anything, these 
studies find shares of variance in earnings (Dunn) and schooling (Ferreira and Veloso) accounted 
for by parental variables which are even higher than ours although, in both cases, this may be due 
to the estimation techniques employed.
25  
 
The role played by inequality of observed opportunities in shaping the inequality of current 
earnings and incomes in Brazil is clearly important. The effects also appear to be larger than in 
                                                 
25 Dunn (2003) instruments for fathers’ earnings using father’s education. As he acknowledges: “If fathers’ 
educations are independently positively correlated with sons’ earnings, then the IV elasticity estimate will be 
upwards-inconsistent.”(p.5). He correctly treats his estimate as an upper-bound. Ferreira and Veloso (2003) use a 
simple OLS estimator, and their coefficient on parents’ education will be upwardly biased if unobserved 
determinants of children’s schooling – such as parental wealth and ability – are positively correlated with parental 
education.  28
other countries for which data is available. Yet, the inequality that they leave unexplained 
remains very substantial. In effect, correcting for observed disparities in opportunities would 
leave the Gini coefficient at 0.45 and above for individual earnings and 0.48 and above for 
income per capita, levels which are higher than total inequality in many countries, including 
those listed in Table 5. Thus, although the inequality of opportunities in Brazil is important, the 
country would still rank high in an international comparison of inequality even after eliminating 
that particular source of inequality.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 also indicated that both the direct and the indirect effects of circumstances on 
earnings are important, each in its own right. This suggests that policies aimed at equalizing 
opportunity may be warranted both inside and beyond the classroom. Parental education – and, to 
a lesser extent, occupation – do affect the length of children’s school careers. Efforts to reduce 
this dependence, through conditional cash-based assistance to students and their families, or 
through after-school programs for students who may be falling behind, might well deserve 
consideration. But family background clearly also impacts on earnings directly, even after 
conditioning on own schooling. This is consistent with hypotheses that both employment and 
career advancement opportunities may be allocated in part through socially-based networks.
26 In 
this paper, we have not presented any evidence on the existence of such networks, or on their 
welfare properties, but further investigation of their operation in the Brazilian case is warranted, 
and may be relevant for the ongoing debate on affirmative action in Brazil. 
 
                                                 
26 Evidence from elsewhere suggests that socially-based networks can be effective in matching workers from certain 
families to coveted jobs. One example is the traditional segmentation of blue-collar occupations in Bombay by jati 
(or sub-caste) groups. While such labor-market effects are likely to impact on educational decisions (as explored by 
Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2003), they also constitute a direct impact of family background on earning opportunities, 
conditional on the child’s schooling attainment.   29
Appendix: Taking into account the endogeneity of efforts and estimating bounds for the 
inequality of opportunities 
 
The measure of the inequality of opportunities used in this paper depends on the estimates of the 
coefficients of the equation that explain earnings as a function of circumstances and efforts –i.e. 
equation (1).  Because of the endogeneity of efforts and the absence of adequate exogenous 
instrument to deal with it, it is necessary to discuss the implications of the bias that this may 
imply for the estimates of the coefficients of the earning equation and therefore for the estimation 
of the inequality of opportunities.  This appendix describes the method used to obtain 'bounds' on 
these estimates, which was inspired by the 'bounds analysis' developed by Manski and Pepper 
(2000), in a different context.  
 
Consider the model :  
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where it is assumed that the error term  i u  is not necessarily orthogonal to all explanatory 
variables in X. Assume without loss of generality that all the variables have zero mean and define 
the following covariance matrices:  
 






= Σ
u u X u
u X X X
' '
' '
   and     X X S ' =  
 
The bias of OLS estimates of equation (i) is given by B in (ii):  
 
u Y Xu S u X S  B B E σ σ ρ β β ) ( ' with  ) ˆ (
1 1 ⊗ = = + =
− −    (ii) 
 
where  Xu ρ  stands for the correlation coefficients between the components of Y and the residual 
term, u, and σ V is the standard error of variable V. Evaluating the bias vector B thus requires 
knowing σ u and  Xu ρ .  An unbiased estimator of  σ u is readily obtained for any set of correlation 
coefficients  Xu ρ . Indeed, it can be shown that :  
 
SB B u u ' ˆ
2 2 + =σ σ  
 
where 
2 ˆu σ is the variance of the OLS residuals. Substituting the value of the bias given in (ii) in 
that expression yields:  
 
) 1 /( ˆ
2 2 K u u − =σ σ          (iii)     
 
with K given by:  30
 
). ( )' (
1
Y Xu Y Xu S K σ ρ σ ρ ⊗ ⊗ =
−        ( i v )  
 
For any set of correlation coefficients  Xu ρ , equations (ii)-(iv) thus permits computing the bias 
vector B and thus obtaining unbiased estimates of the coefficients of the model, β , and of the 
variance of the error term. As these correlation coefficients are not known, the idea is to use 
Monte-Carlo methods: we draw randomly a large number of values for them and derive bounds 
for the estimates of coefficients β , as well as for the results of the micro-simulation exercises 
undertaken in this paper, on the basis of these coefficients.  
 
An important point is that not all vectors of correlation coefficients  Xu ρ are possible, which 
contributes to reducing the size of the bounds. In practical terms, some components of  Xu ρ are 
constrained to be zero – in this paper we have assumed that the residual term u is orthogonal to 
circumstances in equation (1) - while the others are drawn independently from a uniform 
distribution defined on (-1, 1). The correlation coefficient vector  Xu ρ must satisfy the condition 
that the covariance matrix Σ  be positive. All drawings such that this condition is not satisfied 
have been deleted.  
 
We used a set of 300 valid drawings for each simulation leading to an estimation of the inequality 
of opportunities. Figures 1-3 in the text report the mean and extreme values in the set of 300 
results obtained for each calculation. To the extent that these extreme values do not depend on 
any specific assumptions on the correlation between the explanatory variables and the residual 
term, they appear as 'natural bounds' for the analysis of the inequality of opportunities. As the 
distance between them turned out to be rather limited, it did not seem necessary to impose further 
arbitrary restrictions on the correlation coefficient vector, Xu ρ , as in bounds analysis (see, for 
instance, Manski and Pepper, 2000).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 Cohort  b1936_40  b1941_45 b1946_50  b1951_55 b1956_60  b1961_65  b1966_70
         
Mean monthly earnings (Reais, all jobs)  494.9  680.7  743.7 749.4  683.8 607.1  490.1
         
Mean number of years of schooling  4.4  5.5  6.2 7.0  7.4 7.7  7.6
         
Mean  father's number of years of schooling  2.2  2.4  2.7 2.9  3.1 3.5  3.5
         
Mean mother's number of  years of schooling  1.6  1.9  2.2 2.4  2.8 3.2  3.2
         
Race  (Percents)         
Branca (Whites)  59.9  59.1  59.0 59.6  58.5 59.5  57.5
Preta (Blacks)  6.6  6.7  6.3 6.2  5.8 5.3  5.6
Amarela (Asians)  0.4  0.7  0.5 0.5  0.4 0.4  0.3
Parda (MR)  33.1  33.5  34.2 33.8  35.3 34.9  36.7
         
Regions ( Percents)         
North 4.5  4.6  5.3 5.7  5.7 5.5  5.6
North East  33.7  34.6  33.3 29.7  29.2 29.4  32.0
South East  39.1  37.3  36.9 37.5  36.7 34.9  30.7
South 18.9  19.1  19.8 22.0  22.3 23.2  22.8
Center-West 3.9  4.5  4.7 5.2  6.1 7.1  9.0
         
Migrants (Percents)  70.4  69.1  68.8 66.4  63.2 59.4  57.6
         
Number of individuals   2939  4254  6585 8807  10052 10304  8288
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Table 2.a: Wage equations by cohort, men. 
a), b) 
   b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70 
Race                      
      Branca (Whites, omitted)                           
      Preta (Black)  -0.437  **  -0.257  **  -0.309  **  -0.287  **  -0.261  **  -0.178  **  -0.238  ** 
 (0.08)   (0.07)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.05)   
      Amarela (Asians)  -0.013   0.293   0.503  **  0.070   0.305  * 0.143   -0.355   
 (0.32)   (0.16)   (0.16)   (0.16)   (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.22)   
      Parda (MR)  -0.229  **  -0.300  **  -0.271  **  -0.228  **  -0.191  **  -0.174  **  -0.217  ** 
  (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
Parental schooling                       
      Mean parental schooling (years)  0.040  **  0.040  **  0.050  **  0.034  **  0.035  **  0.031  **  0.031  ** 
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
      Mother/father difference (years)  0.006   0.015   0.003   0.008   -0.001   -0.001   0.008   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Region dummies                      
      South East (omitted)                           
      North  -0.217   -0.059   -0.125   -0.076   -0.192  * -0.122  * -0.166  * 
 (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.08)   (0.07)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.06)   
      North East  -0.207  **  -0.149  **  -0.108  **  -0.210  **  -0.162  **  -0.248  **  -0.212  ** 
 (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   
      South  -0.180  **  -0.157  **  -0.118  **  -0.046   -0.043   -0.092  **  -0.096  ** 
 (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   
      Center-West  -0.166   -0.121   -0.002   -0.228  **  -0.062   -0.142  **  -0.046   
 (0.13)   (0.09)   (0.07)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05)   
                      
Years of schooling  0.089  **  0.072  **  0.080  **  0.075  **  0.061  **  0.031  **  0.029  ** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Years of schooling-squared  0.002  * 0.003  **  0.002  **  0.003  **  0.003  **  0.005  **  0.004  ** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
                      
Migrant dummy  0.048   0.177  **  0.168  **  0.111  **  0.115  **  0.128  **  0.157  ** 
  (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
                      
Sample size  1882   2605   3892   5045   5634   5812   4714   
Adjusted R-squared  0.400     0.418     0.450     0.421     0.409     0.421     0.362    
a) Dependent variable is the log of hourly wage rate. Regressions also include dummy variables for father's occupation. 
Coefficients are not reported because of space constraint. b) OLS estimates, standard errors in brackets; *=significant at the 5% 
prob. Level; **=significant at the 1% prob. level.  
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Table 2.b: Wage equations by cohort, women. 
a), b)  
   b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70 
Race                      
      Branca (Whites, omitted)                           
      Preta (Black)  0.152   -0.086   -0.125   -0.144  **  -0.208  **  -0.120   -0.047   
 (0.12)   (0.08)   (0.07)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.07)   
      Amarela (Asians)  0.513   -0.276   -0.060   0.184   0.453  * 0.256   -0.001   
 (0.37)   (0.27)   (0.22)   (0.20)   (0.23)   (0.22)   (0.27)   
      Parda (MR)  -0.153  * -0.169  **  -0.163  **  -0.225  **  -0.106  **  -0.095  **  -0.136  ** 
 (0.07)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.04)   
Parental schooling                       
      Mean parental schooling (years)  0.060  **  0.049  **  0.053  **  0.026  **  0.038  **  0.041  **  0.041  ** 
 (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.01)   
      Mother/father difference (years)  0.015   -0.004   0.001   -0.004   0.009   -0.002   0.003   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Region dummies                      
      South East (omitted)                           
      North  -0.197   -0.101   -0.063   0.016   -0.077   -0.091   -0.100   
 (0.17)   (0.09)   (0.08)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.07)   
      North East  -0.107   -0.259  **  -0.244  **  -0.213  **  -0.304  **  -0.283  **  -0.271  ** 
 (0.07)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.04)   
      South  -0.154  * -0.091   -0.028   -0.079  * -0.059   -0.011   -0.028   
 (0.08)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)   
      Center-West  -0.331  **  -0.195   -0.162  * -0.146  * -0.077   -0.069   -0.117  * 
 (0.14)   (0.11)   (0.08)   (0.07)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.05)   
                      
Years of schooling  0.051   0.069  **  0.026   0.006   0.016   -0.020   -0.017   
 (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Years of schooling-squared  0.003   0.003  **  0.006  **  0.008  **  0.007  **  0.009  **  0.009  ** 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
                      
Migrant dummy  0.134  * 0.128  **  0.122  **  0.109  **  0.092  **  0.098  **  0.137  ** 
 (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.03)   
                      
Self-selection correction term  0.304   0.155   0.234   0.232   0.909  **  0.804  **  0.617  ** 
 (0.28)   (0.23)   (0.22)   (0.22)   (0.22)   (0.15)   (0.19)   
                      
Standard error of residual  0.811   0.740   0.785   0.773   0.909   0.858   0.818   
Number of obs  1057   1648   2692   3760       4490   3573   
Censored obs  249     316     426     505     4418     648     677    
a) Dependent variable is the log of hourly wage rate. Regressions also include dummy variables for father's occupation. 
Coefficients are not reported because of space constraint. b) Two-stage Heckman estimates, standard errors in brackets; 
*=significant at the 5% prob. Level; **=significant at the 1% prob. level.    
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Table 3.a: Schooling determinants, men. 
a), b) 
   b1936_40  b1941_45  b1946_50  b1951_55  b1956_60  b1961_65  b1966_70 
Race                      
      Branca (Whites, omitted)                           
      Preta (Black)  -1.148  **  -1.256  **  -0.909  **  -1.285  **  -1.560  **  -1.449  **  -0.987  ** 
 (0.33)   (0.29)   (0.25)   (0.22)   (0.21)   (0.20)   (0.21)   
      Amarela (Asians)  5.947  **  2.874  **  2.151  **  2.786  **  1.726  **  2.471  **  -1.307   
 (1.29)   (0.66)   (0.69)   (0.70)   (0.67)   (0.69)   (0.98)   
      Parda (MR)  -0.772  **  -1.224  **  -1.118  **  -1.101  **  -1.114  **  -1.213  **  -0.755  ** 
 (0.19)   (0.16)   (0.14)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.10)   (0.11)   
Parental schooling                       
      Mean parental schooling (years)  0.725  **  0.746  **  0.691  **  0.627  **  0.585  **  0.559  **  0.494  ** 
 (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
      Mother/father difference (years)  0.072   0.004   0.048  * 0.009   -0.009   0.016   0.004   
 (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
Region dummies                      
      South East (omitted)                           
      North  -1.363  **  -0.721   -0.688  * -0.431   -0.329   -0.446   -0.454   
 (0.48)   (0.45)   (0.34)   (0.29)   (0.25)   (0.25)   (0.26)   
      North East  -0.993  **  -0.869  **  -0.662  **  -1.031  **  -1.095  **  -0.757  **  -1.006  ** 
 (0.19)   (0.16)   (0.14)   (0.13)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.12)   
      South  0.031   -0.246   -0.628  **  -0.479  **  -0.323  **  -0.115   -0.355  ** 
 (0.23)   (0.21)   (0.17)   (0.14)   (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.13)   
      Center-West  0.171   0.425   -0.422   0.355   -0.232   0.230   -0.276   
 (0.53)   (0.39)   (0.33)   (0.27)   (0.23)   (0.21)   (0.20)   
                      
Sample size  1882   2605   3892   5045   5634   5812   4714   
Adj R-squared  0.432     0.437     0.436     0.409     0.437     0.422     0.349    
a) Dependent variable is years of schooling. Regressions also include dummy variables for father's occupation. 
Coefficients are not reported because of space constraint. b) OLS estimates standard errors in brackets; *=significant at the 
5% prob. Level; **=significant at the 1% prob. level. 
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Table 3.b: Schooling determinants, women. 
a), b) 
   b1936_40  b1941_45  b1946_50  b1951_55  b1956_60  b1961_65  b1966_70 
Race                      
      Branca (Whites, omitted)                           
      Preta  (Black)  0.142  **  -1.154  **  -1.735  **  -0.950  **  -1.671  **  -1.588  **  -1.430  ** 
 (0.40)   (0.39)   (0.30)   (0.27)   (0.24)   (0.25)   (0.26)   
      Amarela (Asians)  2.637  **  1.213   3.497  **  1.168   2.764  **  2.287  **  1.680   
 (0.99)   (1.02)   (0.82)   (0.84)   (0.80)   (0.80)   (0.93)   
      Parda (MR)  -0.589  **  -0.898  **  -1.410  **  -1.343  **  -0.675  **  -1.097  **  -1.070  ** 
 (0.23)   (0.24)   (0.17)   (0.15)   (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)   
Parental schooling                       
      Mean parental schooling (years)  0.751  **  0.724  **  0.749  **  0.633  **  0.622  **  0.534  **  0.486  ** 
 (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
      Mother/father difference (years)  0.088   -0.035   0.071  * 0.073  **  0.097  **  0.049  * 0.085  ** 
 (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
Region dummies                      
      South East (omitted)                           
      North  0.195   -0.164   0.039   0.417   0.098   -0.110   -0.029   
 (0.60)   (0.54)   (0.40)   (0.32)   (0.30)   (0.28)   (0.31)   
      North East  -0.486  * -0.285   -0.141   -0.141   -0.728  **  -0.325  * -0.584  ** 
 (0.23)   (0.24)   (0.18)   (0.16)   (0.14)   (0.14)   (0.14)   
      South  -0.194   -0.216   -0.492  * -0.483  **  -0.502  **  -0.522  **  -0.730  ** 
 (0.28)   (0.27)   (0.20)   (0.17)   (0.15)   (0.14)   (0.15)   
      Center-West  0.202   -0.108   -0.456   0.619   0.107   0.255   -0.143   
 (0.52)   (0.56)   (0.39)   (0.32)   (0.27)   (0.24)   (0.23)   
                      
Sample size  1057   1648   2692   3760   4418   4490   3573   
Adj R-squared  0.469     0.364     0.444     0.384     0.396     0.400     0.362    
a) Dependent variable is years of schooling. Regressions also include dummy variables for father's occupation. 
Coefficients are not reported because of space constraint. b) OLS estimates standard errors in brackets; *=significant at the 
5% prob. Level; **=significant at the 1% prob. level. 
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Figure 1a. Effects of equalizing circumstances on inequality (partial and 
complete effects).
a)
Gini coefficient for 5-year cohorts of men.
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a) Partial and complete effect shown respectively on intermediate and  bottom curves. Dotted lines correspond to 
upper and lower bounds.
 
 
Figure 1b. Effects of equalizing circumstances on inequality (partial and 
complete effects).
a)
Theil coefficient for 5-year cohorts of men.
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a) Partial and complete effect shown respectively on intermediate and  bottom curves. Dotted lines correspond to 
upper and lower bounds.
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Figure 2a. Effects of equalizing circumstances on inequality (partial and 
complete effects).
a)
Gini coefficient for 5-year cohorts of women.
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and lower bounds.
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Figure 2b. Effects of equalizing circumstances on inequality (partial and 
complete effects).
a)
Theil coefficient for 5-year cohorts of women.
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Figure 3a: Complete effect of equalizing individual circumstance variables on 
inequality. Gini coefficient for 5-year cohorts of men.
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Figure 3b: Complete effect of equalizing individual circumstance variables on 
inequality. Gini coefficient for 5-year cohorts of men.
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Figure 4a: Complete effect of equalizing individual circumstance variables on 
inequality. Gini coefficient for 5-year cohorts of women.
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Figure 4b: Complete effect of equalizing individual circumstance variables on 
inequality. Theil coefficient for 5-year cohorts of women.
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Table 4. Complete effects of equalizing circumstances on household income inequality :  
 Gini and Theil coefficient for 5-year cohorts (adult men and women). 
      b1936_40  b1941_45 b1946_50  b1951_55  b1956_60  b1961_65  b1966_70 
                   
  Total Inequality  Gini 0.605  0.602  0.588  0.591  0.597  0.594  0.573 
   Theil  0.75  0.736  0.682  0.72  0.709  0.691  0.635 
Model  simulated                   
Gini 0.534  0.521  0.505  0.504  0.509  0.5  499  Model I: earnings effect (non-labor income, labor supply and 
household size kept constant).  Theil 0.571  0.514  0.496  0.493  0.511  0.472  0.467 
               
Model II : Earnings and  household composition effects.  Gini  0.52  0.506  0.481  0.461  0.468  0.454  0.451 
 Theil  0.516  0.473  0.43  0.402  0.419  0.388  0.382 
               
Model III: all effects, reduced form.  Gini  0.474  0.492  0.481  0.489  0.49  0.478  0.482 
   Theil  0.434  0.475  0.455  0.468  0.465  0.429  0.437 
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Table 5. International comparison of inequality of opportunities :  share of the variance of 
economic status explained by parents characteristics. 
a) 
Source  Definition of study and economic status   Number of studies   Range of  R² 
      
Solon(1999)  Log wages , US studies based on (PSID)  11  .02-.28 
  Log wages, US studies based on NLS  4  .02-.29 
 Non-US  studies  9  .01-.32 
      
Mulligan (1999)  Years of schooling (various countries)  8  .02-.20 
  Log earnings or wages (various countries)  16  .01-.35 
  Log family income (various countries)  10  .02-.42 
  Log family wealth (various countries)  9  .07-.58 
  Log family consumption (US)  2  .35-.59 
      
Dunn (2003)  Log earnings (Brazil)  1    (OLS, 2SLS: men 
only)  .28-.48 
Ferreira & Veloso 
(2003)  Years of schooling (Brazil)  1    (OLS, different 
controls: men only)  .46-.66 
      
This study        
  Years of schooling (Brazil)  6 cohorts/men-women  .35-.47 
  Log earning rate (Brazil)
b) 6  cohorts/men-women  .25-.30 
  Log family income per capita (Brazil)
b) 6  cohorts  .32-.44 
           
a) Solon, Mulligan, Dunn and Ferreira & Veloso originally report the value of the intergenerational elasticity: the β  
coefficient in the Galtonian regression: economic status = α +β *economic status of parents + residual. This estimated 
coefficient is close to the correlation coefficient between the economic status of parents and children, under the 
assumption that the variance of economic status is approximately constant across generations. For comparability with 
our results, the table reports the square of their estimated coefficient, which is directly comparable to R² statistics in 
the regressions undertaken in this paper. 
 b) R² statistics are those associated with the reduced form model where log earnings or log income per capita are 
regressed on circumstance variables only. These regressions are not shown here.   
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